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The present study tested how social information about the proposer biases responders’
choices of accepting or rejecting real monetary offers in a classic ultimatum game (UG)
and whether this impact is heightened by the uncertainty of the context. Participants in
our study conducted a one-shot UG in which their responses had direct consequences
on how much money they earned. We used trait-valenced words to provide information
about the proposers’ personal characteristics.The results show higher acceptance rates for
offers preceded by positive words than for those preceded by negative words. In addition,
the impact of this information was higher in the uncertain than in the certain context. This
suggests that when deciding whether or not to take money from someone, people take
into account what they know about the person they are interacting with. Such non-rational
bias is stronger in an uncertain context.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the emerging field of judgment and decision-making, it
is broadly accepted that humans are not purely rational decision-
makers (see Camerer, 2003). A recent line of research within this
field tries to capture the nature of decision-making in social con-
texts. This is particularly interesting as many of our everyday
choices involve or affect other people.
Regarding the aspects that influence such decisions, different
studies stress the importance of emotions as a biasing factor. It has
been shown that displayed positive and negative facial expressions
(e.g., Scharlemann et al., 2001; Ruz and Tudela, 2011) as well as
induced emotions unrelated to the task (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007)
influence decision-making in inter-personal interactions. Further
aspects that have been found to influence decision-making include
the physical attractiveness and the gender of people with whom we
interact (e.g., Solnick and Schweitzer, 1999; Solnick, 2001; Eckel
and Grossman, 2008).
As another clear biasing factor, social information has been
shown to have an effect on economic choices in social contexts
with high degrees of uncertainty, such as those in the Trust Game
(Delgado et al., 2005). In an iterated Trust Game, trading part-
ners described as morally praiseworthy were trusted more often
than those with neutral or untrustworthy moral character, even
when the descriptions had no predictive value regarding the actual
behavior of the partners. As the reciprocity of the unknown part-
ner in this game has direct consequences on the monetary outcome
of the truster, it seems useful to rely on any relevant information
available to guide trust choices. This matches previous data in
non-social contexts showing that uncertainty increases the value
of information. For example, people might be more disposed to
being influenced when they lack complete knowledge of the situa-
tion (e.g., Behrens et al., 2007; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008) and
might try to make use of any additional piece of information they
can gather. As a practical example, when making decisions on the
stock market, investors facing unstable prices are more receptive
to new tips than during stable periods (Schachter et al., 1985).
There are other social situations in which the degree of uncer-
tainty is smaller than in the Trust Game, such as when making
choices of accepting or rejecting offers in the Ultimatum Game
(UG; Güth et al., 1982). In this game two people interact to
divide a sum of money between them. One of them, the pro-
poser, receives a certain amount of money. He has to split it into
two parts, one for him and one for his counterpart, the respon-
der. The responder then can either accept or reject the proposal.
If he accepts it, both receive their part; if he rejects it, neither the
proposer nor the responder gets any payoff. For the responder
the degree of uncertainty of this situation is low, seeing that he
reacts to a given decision of the proposer in form of a monetary
offer.
From the economic point of view, the self-interested, income-
maximizing homo economicus should accept every kind of offer, no
matter how little it is (Nash, 1950). However, such predicted behav-
ior is not confirmed in experimental settings where small offers (of
20% or below of the initial amount) are rejected about half of the
times (Camerer, 2003). Irrational rejection of unfair offers in the
UG may be explained by several factors, such as inequity aversion
(Fehr and Schmidt,1999) and emotions accompanying the percep-
tion of unfairness. Responders often feel wounded pride and anger
when facing unfair offers and tend to punish their selfish game
partner favoring emotional satisfaction over money gains (Pillutla
and Murnighan, 1996). Physiological (van’t Wout et al., 2006) and
neuroimaging studies (Sanfey et al., 2003) support the important
role of emotions in the UG, showing, for example, that emotion-
ally relevant brain regions, such as the right anterior insula, are
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activated when participants are faced with unfair offers (Sanfey
et al., 2003).
As the responder in the UG finds himself in a situation where
the decision of the proposer has already taken place, there is no
obvious reason why his choices should change depending on the
information he has about the person he interacts with. How-
ever, even in such a certain context social information about the
proposer seems to influence decision-making.
Using a modified version of the UG, Ruz et al. (2011) showed
that personal descriptions of game partners biased decisions to the
same set of offers. Offers preceded by negative words were rejected
with higher probability than those preceded by positive words.
In addition, rejection responses were faster after negative words,
whereas acceptances were faster following positive words, which
suggests that the social information primed action tendencies.
Thus, even though the words did in no manner predict how fair the
following offer was going to be, social information regarding the
partner affected the decisions of participants in this game. Further-
more, these authors introduced a manipulation of the uncertainty
of the social situation and found that the social bias had a much
larger effect when the context of the game was uncertain. Some
characteristics of this study, however, limit the scope of the results.
First, Ruz et al. (2011) used a modification of the UG instead of
the original task setting. In their version, the difference between
the two parts of a split was either one (fair offers) or four (unfair
offers) and the responder’s part of the split could be either higher
or lower than their partner’s amount. Thus, offers could be either
convenient or inconvenient for the participant. Furthermore, to
enable measurement of response times, they required participants
to take their decision within a time limit of 1500 ms. When par-
ticipants did not respond on time, they saw a message stating that
the higher amount of the split would be added to their partner’s
earnings. This leaves open the question of whether similar results
would be obtained in a version closer to the classic UG. Addition-
ally, they did not pay real money to participants, and thus it could
be claimed that the social information biased responses because
participants did not have anything at stake.
Two recent studies solve part of these problems. Campanhã
et al. (2011) used the classic UG and demonstrated that friendship
with the proposer modulated the choices made by the responder in
the game. More specifically, responders rejected unfair offers less
frequently when the proposer was believed to be a friend rather
than an unknown person. However, as several rounds were played
with the same partner, it is not sure that the responders’ choices
reflected responses to a single offer instead of bargaining behavior.
It must also be noted that no real money was offered to par-
ticipants. Furthermore, interactions with a friend can always be
affected by the long-term relation we hold with this person, which
may have affected the results found by Campanhã et al. (2011).
Another study (Marchetti et al., 2011) showed that the type
of information about the proposer provided to the responder has
an influence on decision-making in the UG. Most interestingly,
they found an interaction between the psychological description
of the partner and the fairness of the offer: a negative (selfish)
description of the proposer led to a decreased acceptance rate
of fair offers, while a positive (generous) description led to an
increased acceptance rate of unfair offers. As this study employed
one-shot interactions with unknown partners, concerns regarding
long-term interactions or even friendship do not arise. However,
as in the game by Ruz et al. (2011) and in the study of Campanhã
et al. (2011), participants in this study did not receive money in
accordance with their decisions.
Thus, it still has to be tested whether social information regard-
ing the partner in a classic UG biases people’s decisions to offers
of real money, which was the goal of the present study. We
conducted a classic computerized, one-shot UG and used trait-
valenced words to describe the moral characteristics of otherwise
unknown partners. As previous results indicate that the level of
uncertainty modulates the scope of the biasing information in a
modified UG (Ruz et al., 2011), we included a manipulation of
uncertainty to explore whether the level of uncertainty also affects
responses in the classic UG.
Participants of our experiment played the role of the respon-
ders and received either fair or unfair offers from several different
proposers represented by the computer. Following the findings of
the classic UG it was hypothesized that more fair than unfair offers
would be accepted. As a description of the partners’ characteris-
tics in each trial, each offer was preceded by a word with positive
or negative valence highly linked to morality and trustworthiness
(see Table 1). It was hypothesized that acceptance rates would
be biased by this social information, with higher acceptance rates
for offers preceded by positive than for those preceded by nega-
tive words. Additionally, participants had either full or incomplete
information about the outcome of their choices, which modulated
the uncertainty of the game. In the certain condition, participants
were informed of which part of the split corresponded to them,
while this information was not given in the uncertain condition.
It was hypothesized that the influence of the valence of the word
would be higher in the uncertain context. Experiment 1 confirmed
these hypotheses. Experiment 2 showed that personal information
only influenced choices when it was attributed to the partners in
the game.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 manipulated the level of uncertainty (uncertain vs.
certain), the type of offer proposed by the partner in the trial (fair
Table 1 | List of words selected as stimuli in the study and acceptance
rates of offers depending on the word that preceded the offer.
Positive words Accepted
offers (%)
Negative words Accepted
offers (%)
Friend 79 (19) Hostile 60 (25)
Humble 76 (19) Selfish 53 (26)
Honorable 75 (18) Guilty 53 (25)
Generous 74 (17) Disloyal 52 (27)
Loyal 73 (19) False 48 (28)
Warm 73 (19) Cruel 47 (29)
Honest 72 (23) Traitor 47 (27)
Kind 71 (20) Criminal 41 (29)
Mean 74 (16) Mean 50 (23)
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience July 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 103 | 2
Gaertig et al. Social information and economic decision-making
vs. unfair) and the valence of the word preceding the offer (positive
vs. negative).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-six native Spanish-speaking, right-handed students from
the University of Granada participated in the study (23 female,
18–27 years, average 21.5). All participants signed a consent form
approved by the Department of Experimental Psychology of the
University of Granada. In exchange for their participation in the
study, participants were paid. The payment amount depended on
their earnings during the game task and ranged from about 3–6
Euros.
Stimuli
Sixteen trait-valenced words were selected from the Spanish trans-
lation of the Affective Norms English Word database (ANEW;
Redondo et al., 2007) as stimuli in the study. The words selected
provided moral and trustworthiness information and had either a
positive (in average 7.5, SE = 0.5) or a negative valence (in average
1.9, SE = 0.3). Positive and negative words were equated regard-
ing number of letters and frequency of use (average number of
letters: 6; average frequency: 21.72; all ps> 0.390). The English
translation of the words used is listed in Table 1.
Procedure
First, an introduction explaining the rules of the UG was given to
the participants. They were told that they were going to play the
UG in the role of the responder and were going to receive offers
that other participants had made in previous experiments of the
lab. To enhance the plausibility of this cover story, participants
completed a short questionnaire in which they themselves gener-
ated offers for 16 anonymous partners. For each partner they were
asked to decide how to divide 10 Euros into two parts, one for
them and the other one for their partner.
Before conducting the game, participants were informed that
they were playing with actual money, which was to strengthen
their motivation to make real decisions. They were informed that
one point earned in the game was to be exchanged for 1.5 cents of
Euro. To avoid possible influences of previous reciprocation, they
were told that on each trial they were going to play with a different
partner, who was never the same across the game.
The initial amount of the proposer was always 10 Euros, and the
split proposed to the responder was presented in the middle of the
screen. To every participant, the same set of splits including two
kinds of fair offers (5/5, 4/6) and three different kinds of unfair
offers (1/9, 2/8, 3/7) was presented. These types of offers match
the range of offers that humans normally propose in the role of
the proposers in the UG.
In total, participants received 128 offers and they had to accept
or reject each of them by pressing the number 1 or 2 (counter-
balanced across participants) of the computer keyboard. If they
accepted the offer, their part of the split was added to their earn-
ings and their partner for the trial received the other part. If they
rejected the offer, no transaction was carried out.
Additionally, each offer was preceded by a word. Participants
were told that the words represented personal descriptions of their
partner and that these characteristics had been obtained through
questionnaires completed by the same participants that made the
offer proposals in previous experiments. The same words were
presented in a different random order to each participant. Half of
the words had a positive valence and the other half had a nega-
tive one (see Table 1). In reality, the valence of the words was not
related in any way to the type of offer, as each word was followed
equally often by fair and unfair offers.
To test whether the uncertainty of the context influenced
decision-making in the classic version of the UG, the whole task
consisted of two blocks (order counterbalanced across partici-
pants) differing in the information provided to participants. In
the certain block, as in the original game, participants knew which
part of the split would be added to their earnings if they accepted
the offer. Therefore, for each split the two numbers were presented
in different colors (green and red) and participants were told which
of the colors corresponded to them (counterbalanced across par-
ticipants). Accordingly to the range of offers normally proposed by
humans in the game, the participants’ part of the split always con-
sisted in the smaller or equal (5/5 offer) number. In the uncertain
block, in contrast, participants did not know which part of the split
would be added to their earnings, as both numbers were presented
in black. Therefore they lacked that part of the information.
The experiment was conducted using a PC running E-Prime
software (Schneider et al., 2002). Each trial (see Figure 1) started
with a fixation cross presented for 1500 ms (+ ; 0.4˚) in the center
of the screen. Following this, the word (average 2.5˚) was dis-
played for 200 ms, and then, the fixation point was presented for
another 700 ms. Subsequently, the offer (1.5˚), consisting of two
numbers separated by a slash symbol, appeared in the center of
the screen until the participant made the response. Following the
decision of the participant, the next trial began. The whole exper-
iment consisted of 128 trials and had an approximate duration of
10 min.
RESULTS
The acceptance rate measured in percentage of accepted offers
was analyzed by a 2 (uncertainty: uncertain vs. certain)× 2 (offer:
FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in a trial.
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fair vs. unfair)× 2 (valence of the word: positive vs. negative)
multifactorial ANOVA.
On average participants accepted 62.1% of all offers across the
experiment (Figure 2). There was a main effect of the fairness
of the offer (F1,35= 86.25, p< 0.001), as fair offers were accepted
more often (M = 85%, SE = 17%) than unfair ones (M = 39%,
SE = 25%). Decisions were also influenced by the valence of the
word (F1,35= 33.64, p< 0.001). Offers were accepted more often
when they were preceded by positive words (M = 74%,SE = 16%)
than by negative words (M = 50%, SE = 23%). Table 1 shows the
acceptance rates of offers separately for each trait-valenced word.
In addition, a significant interaction between uncertainty and
the fairness of the offer was found (F1,35= 12.38, p< 0.01). In the
certain condition, the effect of the offer was higher (51%) than in
the uncertain condition (39%). Furthermore, unfair offers were
accepted more often in the uncertain (44%) than in the certain
context (35%; F1,35= 9.65, p< 0.01), whereas there was no signif-
icance difference between the acceptance rate of fair offers in both
contexts (83 vs. 86%, F1,35= 3.13, p= 0.086). Finally, as predicted
there was a significant interaction between uncertainty and valence
of the word (F1,35= 8.01, p< 0.01). The effect of the valence of
the word was higher in the uncertain (28%) than in the certain
condition (20%).
In the analysis described above all offers are included (5/5, 4/6,
3/7, 2/8, and 1/9) for both certain and uncertain contexts. The
experiment included the fair offer 5/5 to mimic the range of offers
normally proposed in the classic UG. Nevertheless, it is clear that
when facing this offer participants knew that they would get five
points, both in the certain and uncertain blocks. Therefore, we
conducted a second analysis excluding the 5/5 offers to ensure that
our main results were not affected by this. This analysis replicated
all previous results.
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 confirm our initial hypotheses. First
of all and in agreement with typical findings in the UG (Camerer,
2003), the fairness of the offer influenced participants’ choices in
a major way as fair offers were accepted more often than unfair
offers.
With regard to the main question of interest of this study, our
results show that trait-valenced words influence decision-making
in the classic UG in which the decisions of participants influenced
how much money they earned. Offers preceded by positive trait-
words were accepted more often than those preceded by negative
trait-words. Crucially, we show that this bias exists in a classic
UG in which long-term effects were not present, as participants
were interacting only once with a partner not personally known
to them. Furthermore, participants in our study knew that their
aggregate decisions of each trial determined the amount of money
that they were going to earn. Therefore, they were motivated to
take their decisions seriously. However, their choices of accepting
or rejecting an offer were influenced by the information they had
FIGURE 2 | Acceptance rates of fair and unfair offers preceded by positive
and negative words in the uncertain and certain condition (Experiment 1).
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. Lines represent significant
effects of the positive vs. negative valence of the trait-words (***p<0.001).
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about their respective partners on each trial. Thus, they did not
act purely rational, but took into account what they knew about
the other person to accept or not the money. The social infor-
mation biased choices, although objectively trait-valenced words
and offers were not associated, insofar as positive and negative
words were paired with the same set of offers. Due to such lack
of association between words and offers, a learning effect can be
excluded.
Two aspects might have influenced participants’ reactions in
our study using the classic UG. First, it is possible that the subjec-
tive perception of fairness for all kinds of offers was biased by the
social information provided. Offers made by a negatively described
person might have been perceived as less fair than those made by
a positively described person. Research on the UG suggests that
responders in the UG reject unfair offers due to the perceived
unfairness and the negative emotions arising from this perception
(Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey et al., 2003). When provid-
ing a negative description, responders’ attention may have focused
on the negative aspects of the offer (e.g., the proposer assigns
more to himself than to me) rather than on the possible gains, as
they were already expecting an unfair offer. Additional to and in
congruence with biased subjective perception, negative emotional
reactions may have been stronger in this condition, which would
have led to lower acceptance rates. In the future, it could be use-
ful to include emotional measures such as skin conductance, to
directly evaluate the role that emotional reactions may play in the
current paradigm.
Another accompanying explanation places the bias in a later
stage of decision-making. From this perspective, offers would be
perceived in the same manner, and the biasing effect would take
place afterward, during the decision stage to punish the partner
or not. Participants punished partners tied to a negative descrip-
tion more than those associated to positive characteristics. This
explanation is consistent with real life experience, as people nor-
mally behave more nobly toward friendly persons, even when the
chances of meeting the same person again are unlikely. We will
take a closer look at the question of how to decide between these
two approaches in the general discussion.
In addition to the offer fairness and the valence of the words, we
manipulated the certainty of the context (uncertain vs. certain) as
a third independent variable. In the uncertain context responders
lacked the information about which part of the offer was assigned
to them. Therefore, they could not judge whether the offer was
advantageous for them or not, which is of particular relevance in
the face of unequal splits.
We found that offer fairness interacted with uncertainty, as
unfair offers were accepted more frequently in the uncertain than
in the certain context, while the acceptance rate of fair offers did
not differ in both conditions. The higher acceptance rate of unfair
offers in the uncertain condition was not predicted. However, the
limited possibility of objectively judging offers as convenient or
inconvenient and thus, a possible lower arousal of negative emo-
tions in the face of unfair offers, might explain this effect (see
also Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). It is also possible, that in the
uncertain context responders simply feared the rejection of a con-
venient split and therefore accepted more offers consisting of an
unequal split.
Finally and as predicted, uncertainty modulated the weight
of the social information. The influence of the words was not
restricted to uncertain situations, but it was higher in this context.
As responders were not able to judge the convenience of the offer
in the uncertain context, they might have weighted the informa-
tion they received more highly and used it to generate expectations
about the offer.
The results clearly show that the valence of the information
about the proposer influences decisions made by participants in
the classic UG. However, an alternative and less appealing expla-
nation of our results could be that the presentation of positive
and negative words primed participants with a valence-consistent
mood in an automatic manner. To rule out that this is the case in
our findings, we conducted Experiment 2.
A possible control experiment to study the automatic effect
that valenced words may have on acceptance rates would be to
use non-trait-words as primes, matched in valence and arousal
ratings to the words used in Experiment 1. However, such a con-
trol would entail a change both in the words and the instructions
(as words can no longer be attributed to the personal characteris-
tics of the partners), which would make the interpretation of the
results difficult. An alternative option, which is the one we chose
for our control study, is to use exactly the same items but to change
the instructions regarding the social meaning of the words in the
game.
EXPERIMENT 2
We conducted a second experiment to rule out the possibility that
the impact of the words in Experiment 1 could be explained by
an “automatic” priming effect driven by the mere presentation of
words with high positive and negative connotations.
In Experiment 2 we told participants that the computer pre-
sented the words at random before each offer, and thus that they
had nothing to do with the person who initially proposed the offer.
Except for this minor change in the whole set of instructions, the
experimental design was exactly the same as in Experiment 1. It
was hypothesized that if the mere presence of the words, regardless
of their association to the partners in the game, generates prim-
ing, results from Experiment 2 should be quite similar to those of
Experiment 1. In contrast, if the key manipulation is the associa-
tion of the words with the personality characteristics of the people
we interact with, decision-making should not be influenced by
words in the current experiment.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Thirty-six native Spanish-speaking students from the University
of Granada participated in the study (27 female, 18–38 years, aver-
age 23.3). All participants signed a consent form approved by
the Department of Experimental Psychology of the University of
Granada. In exchange for their participation in the study, partici-
pants were paid. The payment amount depended on their earnings
during the game task and ranged from about 3–6 Euros.
Stimuli and procedure
Stimuli and Methods were the same as in Experiment 1 with the
exception that participants received a different instruction regard-
ing the meaning of the words preceding each offer. They were told
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that the words were randomly presented by the computer program
and that they were in no manner linked neither to the offers, nor
to their partners in the game. As in Experiment 1, we manipu-
lated the variables uncertainty (uncertain vs. certain), offer (fair
vs. unfair), and valence of the word (positive vs. negative).
RESULTS
On average participants accepted 65.8% of all offers across
the experiment (Figure 3). There was a significant main effect
of offer fairness (F1,35= 67.84, p< 0.001), as fair offers were
accepted more often (M = 89%, SE = 18%) than unfair ones
(M = 42%, SE = 28%). The uncertainty of the context also
influenced participants’ choices. Offers in the uncertain con-
text were accepted more often (M = 69%, SE = 16%) than in
the certain context (M = 63%, SE = 18%), F1,35= 8.82, p< 0.05.
Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between these
two variables (F1,35= 11.13, p< 0.01). The effect of the offer
in the certain condition was higher (55%) than in the uncer-
tain condition (40%). Again, whereas the acceptance rate of
fair offers did not differ significantly in both contexts (89 vs.
90%, F1,35= 0.14, p= 0.713), unfair offers were accepted more
often in the uncertain (49%) than in the certain context (35%;
F1,35= 16.38, p< 0.001). There was neither a significant main
effect of the valence of the word, nor any other interaction (all
ps> 0.28).
DISCUSSION
As it was the case in Experiment 1, in Experiment 2 participants’
choices were influenced by the fairness of the offer. In contrast to
Experiment 1, however, participants’ choices were not affected by
the words and there was no interaction between block uncertainty
and word-valence. Hence, the mere presentation of valenced words
does not prime action tendencies that lead participants to modify
their acceptance decisions. This result strongly suggests that the
key element for such biasing to occur is the link of the words to
social characteristics of the partners in the game.
It might be argued that given that the instructions clearly told
participants that the words were not related with the subsequent
offers they did not pay attention to this information, which would
explain the lack of effect of the words on acceptance decisions.
Withdrawing attentional resources is indeed a normal conse-
quence of deeming something as irrelevant to the task at hand
(e.g., Driver, 2001), and thus it is likely that this took place in
our experiment. Future studies should test the level of processing
accrued by irrelevant words in this procedure by means of both
explicit and more implicit memory tests (e.g., Ruz and Fuentes,
2009) as well as with brain imaging techniques (e.g., Ruz et al.,
2005).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to determine the influence of
social information about people with whom we interact in a clas-
sic UG and to test whether such impact was modulated by the
uncertainty of the context. We showed that positive and negative
trait-words influenced acceptance rates to the same set of offers
in a one-shot UG with unknown partners in which participants
earned money, and that this effect was higher in the uncertain
context. As Experiment 2 showed, the key aspect for the influence
FIGURE 3 | Acceptance rates of fair and unfair offers preceded by positive and negative words in the uncertain and certain condition (Experiment 2).
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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of social information was the link between trait-valenced words
and the characteristics of the proposer.
Our results extend the findings of the study of Ruz et al.
(2011), which used a modified version of the UG instead of the
original game. Responders in our current experiment received a
single offer from different anonymous partners and thus no long-
term strategies can explain their behavior, as it might be the case
when playing several rounds of the UG with the same partner
or when interacting with a friend (Campanhã et al., 2011). As
participants accumulated money with each accepted offer, their
final payment depended directly on their choices in the game.
Showing that, nevertheless, social information and offer fairness
influenced acceptance rates of such monetary offers, the present
study nicely complements recent reports using the UG without
money payment (Campanhã et al., 2011; Marchetti et al., 2011;
Ruz et al., 2011). Furthermore and in addition to previous stud-
ies, the manipulation of uncertainty allowed us to test how this
variable modulates the impact of the social information.
It could be argued, however, that the payment associated to each
offer was too small, as one point earned in the game was exchanged
for 1.5 cents. Given the small amount participants were able to earn
with each accepted offer, they still might not have been motivated
to take the decisions seriously, and this could have led them to take
social information into consideration. Perhaps, if the outcome had
been higher they might have weighted their own and the others’
outcome in each trial more. However, previous studies using the
UG showed that this explanation is unlikely, as it is commonly
found that raising the stakes to a large amount has only a weak
impact on rejection rates (Camerer, 2003). Although it is always
possible to claim that bigger amounts of money could obliterate
a positive result, our results show that by using payments within
common ranges used in the UG we can prove that people take
into account their impressions of others to accept or reject their
monetary offers.
Other limits regarding the experimental setting nevertheless
persist. To assure an adequate control, the experiment was con-
ducted in the laboratory and monetary offers were presented
through the computer. In addition, every participant interacted
only once with each partner to avoid effects of reciprocity. One of
the drawbacks of this artificiality is the caution it imposes regard-
ing the generality of the effects to less artificial, daily life situations.
Note, however, that our design replicates basic phenomena found
in many previous studies, such as the rejection of unfair offers even
when they are beneficial to the participants in economic terms.
On the other side, the experimental setting of the current study
provides clear benefits for the design of a research study to explore
the neural mechanisms underlying the biasing effect of social
information. Previous studies employing the ERP methodology
(Boksem and De Cremer, 2010; Campanhã et al., 2011) suggest
that fair and unfair offers are perceived differently, and that this
effect takes place at a relatively early stage of processing. Campanhã
et al.’s (2011) ERP results further indicate that the medial frontal
negativity responds to social distance, as its polarity is reversed
when the offer is made by a close friend rather than an unknown
proposer. In the future, it would be interesting to further explore
the biological basis of inter-personal decisions and to analyze how
the inclusion of social information modulates these mechanisms.
To date, it remains unclear whether the effects are driven by a
rather automatic kind of processing, which leads to a different
perception of the offer after the presentation of valenced informa-
tion, or by a controlled process at a later stage of decision-making.
Further studies using electrophysiological methods could provide
a closer look on the cognitive processes occurring when perceiving
the offer, dependent on the valence of the social information, and,
thus, could help exploring at which level of information processing
social information affects decision-making.
Additional research is also needed to explore the relation
between the influence of social information on responders’ choices
and a possible expectancy or framing effect. Sanfey (2009) showed
that expectations of fairness have a strong influence on responders’
decisions in the UG. The importance of framing effects is also
discussed in Marchetti et al. (2011) to explain that positive and
negative descriptions of the proposer bias the acceptance of offers
in the UG. This study used psychological attributes very closely
linked to fairness expectations (generous vs. selfish). Our results
complement their findings, showing that different positive and
negative descriptions of the partner in the UG influence decision-
making. This influence exists although objectively the design of the
task does not associate the trait-valenced words with the offers, as
positive and negative items are presented equally often with fair
and unfair offers. Future studies should test expectation genera-
tion more directly to help fully understand the relation between
social information and a framing effect.
Other future lines of research could include the combination of
an emotional introduction and the presentation of social informa-
tion. While induced negative emotions are correlated with higher
rejection rates of unfair offers (Harlé and Sanfey, 2007), in the
present study the same effect was shown regarding negative social
information. It would be interesting to link both approaches, test-
ing whether the introduction of positive or negative moods biases
the impact of social information.
Overall, our results show once again that human behavior is
motivated by more than pure income maximization. The opinion
we hold regarding the moral characteristics of people with whom
we interact modulates our tendencies to accept or reject the money
that they offer us. The uncertainty of the context furthermore has
an effect on how we make use of this information. The present
study provides further insights into the complex decision-making
processes during inter-personal interactions and gives way to new
questions for future research using economic games.
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